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Zylberman et al.: Unfit to Parent

UNFIT TO PARENT: AMERICAN AND JEWISH LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES
Michoel Zylberman, Karen K. Greenberg, & Daniel Pollack *
I.

INTRODUCTION

When do parents become unfit to parent their children?
Broadly speaking, parental unfitness may be determined by
considering such factors as a parent’s conduct and capacity to provide
for their child’s needs. Parents who are judicially determined to be
unfit may have their parental rights terminated, may lose custody, or
have visitation orders drastically modified or denied. Should a court
decide that both parents are unfit, a child may be placed in foster care
or be available for adoption. Unfitness to parent may arise in a variety
of circumstances: allegations of child maltreatment (abandonment,
abuse, and neglect), custody, incarceration of the parent, or disability
or incompetence of the parent. These specific issues are discussed,
from an American legal perspective in Part II. Part III addresses
similar issues from a Halachic perspective—Jewish law and
jurisprudence, based on the Talmud.

*Michoel

Zylberman serves as a rosh chabura at the Rabbi Isaac Elchanan Theological
Seminary, Yeshiva University, New York City. He also functions as Assistant Director/Gittin
Coordinator of the Beth Din of America, and Geirut Coordinator of the Rabbinical Council of
America and the Beth Din of America; Karen K. Greenberg is a partner at Konowitz &
Greenberg, Wellesley Hills, MA. Her family law practice focuses on complex, high conflict
family law matters, adoption, divorce, custody and paternity issues. A founding member of
the Academy of Adoption and Assisted Reproduction Attorneys, she served as President,
2008-2009; Daniel Pollack is professor at Wurzweiler School of Social Work, Yeshiva
University, New York City, and a frequent expert witness in cases regarding child abuse and
foster care.
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AMERICAN LEGAL PERSPECTIVES

The first part of this article focuses on child maltreatment from
the civil perspective. All states have statutes that define the abuse of a
child criminally 1 as well as civilly. 2
1 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 843.5 (2020). Child abuse means the willful or malicious
harm or threatened harm or failure to protect from harm or threatened harm to the health,
safety, or welfare of a child under eighteen (18) years of age by another, or the act of willfully
or maliciously injuring, torturing or maiming a child under eighteen (18) years of age by
another.
Id; See also, FLA. STAT. § 827.03 (2020).
2 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2271 (2020): Presumption of unfitness, when; burden of
proof:
(a) It is presumed in the manner provided in K.S.A. 60-414, and
amendments thereto, that a parent is unfit by reason of conduct or
condition which renders the parent unable to fully care for a child, if the
state establishes, by clear and convincing evidence, that:
(1) A parent has previously been found to be an unfit parent in proceedings
under K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 38-2266 et seq., and amendments thereto, or
comparable proceedings under the laws of another jurisdiction;
(2) a parent has twice before been convicted of a crime specified in article
34, 35, or 36 of chapter 21 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated, prior to their
repeal, or articles 54, 55 or 56 of chapter 21 of the Kansas Statutes
Annotated, or K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21-6104, 21-6325, 21-6326 or 21-6418
through 21-6421, and amendments thereto, or comparable offenses under
the laws of another jurisdiction, or an attempt or attempts to commit such
crimes and the victim was under the age of 18 years;
(3) on two or more prior occasions a child in the physical custody of the
parent has been adjudicated a child in need of care as defined by K.S.A.
2014 Supp. 38-2202(d)(1), (d)(3), (d)(5) or (d)(11), and amendments
thereto, or comparable proceedings under the laws of another jurisdiction;
(4) the parent has been convicted of causing the death of another child or
stepchild of the parent;
(5) the child has been in an out-of-home placement, under court order for
a cumulative total period of one year or longer and the parent has
substantially neglected or willfully refused to carry out a reasonable plan,
approved by the court, directed toward reintegration of the child into the
parental home;
(6) (A) the child has been in an out-of-home placement, under court order
for a cumulative total period of two years or longer; (B) the parent has
failed to carry out a reasonable plan, approved by the court, directed
toward reintegration of the child into the parental home; and (C) there is a
substantial probability that the parent will not carry out such plan in the
near future;
(7) a parent has been convicted of capital murder, K.S.A. 21-3439, prior
to its repeal, or K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21-5401, and amendments thereto,
murder in the first degree, K.S.A. 21-3401, prior to its repeal, or K.S.A.
2014 Supp. 21-5402, and amendments thereto, murder in the second
degree, K.S.A. 21-3402, prior to its repeal, or K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21-5403,
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Child Maltreatment

Child maltreatment may be present anytime, anywhere – even
at the earliest stages of a child’s life in the womb or at birth.
1.

In The Womb

Child maltreatment may begin in the womb. Notwithstanding
the controversy as to whether or not or when a fetus is considered a
person, the entity growing inside the mother’s womb is subjected to its
mother’s actions and habits. 3 According to the Guttmacher Policy

and amendments thereto, voluntary manslaughter, K.S.A. 21-3403, prior
to its repeal, or K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21-5404, and amendments thereto,
human trafficking or aggravated human trafficking, K.S.A. 21-3446 or 213447, prior to their repeal, or K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21-5426, and
amendments thereto, or commercial sexual exploitation of a child, K.S.A.
2014 Supp. 21-6422, and amendments thereto, or comparable proceedings
under the laws of another jurisdiction or, has been adjudicated a juvenile
offender because of an act which if committed by an adult would be an
offense as provided in this subsection, and the victim of such murder was
the other parent of the child;
(8) a parent abandoned or neglected the child after having knowledge of
the child’s birth or either parent has been granted immunity from
prosecution for abandonment of the child under K.S.A. 21-3604(b), prior
to its repeal, or K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21-5605(d), and amendments thereto;
or
(9) a parent has made no reasonable efforts to support or communicate
with the child after having knowledge of the child’s birth;
(10) a father, after having knowledge of the pregnancy, failed without
reasonable cause to provide support for the mother during the six months
prior to the child’s birth;
(11) a father abandoned the mother after having knowledge of the
pregnancy;
(12) a parent has been convicted of rape, K.S.A. 21-3502, prior to its
repeal, or K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21-5503, and amendments thereto, or
comparable proceedings under the laws of another jurisdiction resulting
in the conception of the child; or
(13) a parent has failed or refused to assume the duties of a parent for two
consecutive years next preceding the filing of the petition. In making this
determination the court may disregard incidental visitations, contacts,
communications or contributions.
Id.
3 Hollie Silverman & Ralph Ellis, A Pregnant Woman Was Shot, then Indicted in her Baby’s
Death. Lawyers will try to get the Charges Dismissed, CNN (Jun. 30, 2019)
www.cnn.com/2019/06/30 usalabama-pregnantwomanlawyers-motion/index.html.
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Review, 4 twenty-three states and the District of Columbia consider
substance use during pregnancy to be child abuse under civil childwelfare statutes, and three consider it grounds for civil commitment.5
Twenty-five states and the District of Columbia require health care
professionals to report suspected prenatal drug use, and eight states
require them to test for prenatal drug exposure if they suspect drug
use. 6 The extent of harm inflicted by the mother on the fetus is not
always known. 7 Nevertheless, courts have ruled drug use during
pregnancy to be severe child abuse, even in the absence of an injury to
or long term effects on a child. 8
Many courts have held that prenatal drug use constitutes severe
child abuse for purposes of terminating parental rights. 9 Courts have
also held that a mother’s drug abuse during pregnancy resulting in the
child being born drug-addicted and injured, constitutes severe child
abuse. 10 For instance, in In re A.L.C.M., 11 the court held that the
presence of illegal drugs in the child’s system at birth constitutes
sufficient evidence that the child is an abused or neglected child. 12 In
the A.L.C.M. case, the court found a father’s alleged failure to stop the
mother’s illegal drug use during her pregnancy, would support a

The Guttmacher Policy Review (GPR) analyzes sexual and reproductive health policy
making in Washington and state capitals across the U.S. and makes connections across a wide
range of sexual and reproductive health topics, including abortion, contraception, teen
pregnancy, sexually transmitted infections, and maternal and child health. Guttmacher Policy
INSTITUTE
(last
accessed
Jan.
13,
2020)
Review,
GUTTMACHER
https://www.guttmacher.org/gpr.
5 Substance Use During Pregnancy, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE (last accessed Mar. 31, 2020)
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/substance-use-during-pregnancy.
6 Id.
7 Alcohol, Drugs, and Babies: Do You Need to Worry?, WEBMD (last accessed Jan. 13,
2020) https://www.webmd.com/baby/drug-use-and-pregnancy#1.
8 In re P.T.F., No. E2016-01077-COA-R3-PT, at 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jun. 12, 2017); see
also In re Shannon P., No. E2012-00445-C0A-R3-PT, at *5 (Tenn. Ct .App. May 13, 2013).
9 In re Colton B., No. M2018-01053-COA-R3-PT, at *22 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2018);
In re Ethin E.S., No. E2011-02478-COA-R3-PT, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2012) (“this
Court has repeatedly held that a mother’s prenatal drug use can constitute severe child abuse
in termination of parental rights cases”); In re Joshua E.R., No. W2011-02127-COA-R3-PT,
at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 15, 2012) (“In light of our prior holdings, and the supreme court
and General Assembly’s disinclination to overrule them, we continue to hold that prenatal
drug abuse may constitute severe child abuse for the purpose of terminating parental rights.”).
10 In re Benjamin M., 310 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
11 239 W. Va. 382, 392 (2017).
12 W. VA. CODE § 49-1-201 (2015) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
4
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finding of abuse based upon his knowledge that another person is
harming his/her child. 13
2.

At Birth

There is much case law addressing child maltreatment when a
child is born with drugs in his or her system, which results in the
termination of parental rights. 14 Regrettably, if a mother has a history
of drug abuse, and has failed to follow a service plan—as directed by
the department of children and families—it is not unexpected that upon
the birth of a subsequent child, custody will be taken from her, by the
appropriate state department for child abuse. 15
Of course, grounds for removing a child upon birth are
multifarious and not just because of drug use, although often related.
In the Goodman case 16, the court referenced other factors: ignoring the
care of a parent’s children when disappearing for periods of time while
overdosing on cocaine; a consequence to fail to provide basic
necessaries for the children, such as food, heat, suitable housing, all of
which place the children at severe risk for abandonment and harm in
the future. 17
Drug abuse is just one of many reasons why a child may be
taken into custody at birth for suspected child abuse. The definition of
child abuse 18 includes a child being found neglected when among other
things, “… it is being permitted to live under conditions, circumstances
or associations injurious to the wellbeing of the child…” 19

Id.; W. VA. CODE § 49-1-201.
In re K.T., No. 11-0819, 2011, at *2-3 (W. Va. 2011) (holding that a mother’s rights
terminated when second child was also born drug addicted, the court saw no reason to allow
mother time to rehabilitate when she had not complied with her service plan.); In re JAIMAR
WESTLY GOODMAN, TELA MARIE LARKS-GOODMAN, JEVEINA KATRICIA
LARKS-GOODMAN, JERMAINE ANTONIO CHANDLER-GOODMAN, & TIA
LASHONDA GRAY-GOODMAN, Minors, No. 223381, at *3-4 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 30,
2001) (holding that a mother gave birth to two crack addicted babies, parental rights
terminated, returning the children to respondent would not be in the best interests of the
children because of reasonable likelihood that conditions such as drug use and neglect of
children in the home rectified within a reasonable time.)
15 In re K.T., supra note 14.
16 Goodman, supra note 14.
17 Id. at 8.
18 Supra note 2.
19 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-120 (4) (C).
13
14
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Often, the child is taken soon after birth because of the doctrine of
predictive neglect. 20 In In re Joseph W., the court held that:
The doctrine of predictive neglect is grounded in the
state’s responsibility to avoid harm to the wellbeing of
a child, not to repair it after a tragedy has occurred. . .
Thus, [a] finding of neglect is not necessarily
predicated on actual harm, but can exist when there is a
potential risk of neglect. . . . 21
In In re Joseph W., a mother’s rights had previously been
terminated in 2007 with her oldest child. 22 At that time, it was
determined that the mother’s mental problems impaired her ability to
safely parent her child, although the department had worked with the
mother between 2002 and 2005 to remedy the concerns. 23 The mother
and father left the state prior to Joseph’s birth to avoid involvement
with the department. 24 Nevertheless, the mother continued to exhibit
such disconcerting behavior that steps were taken to cause Joseph to
be ordered into the department’s custody and care. 25 Upon the birth of
the parties’ second child, the state stepped in again. 26 The court
determined both children were neglected under the doctrine of
predictive neglect. 27
All states have procedures to remove a child from a caretaker
when there is a concern as to abuse or neglect and provide services to
the caretaker to ameliorate the conditions of neglect and abuse. 28 As
in the Dana S. case, parental rights are terminated because the caretaker
failed to follow through with a service plan. 29
In re Joseph W., 305 Conn. 633, 644-645 (2012).
Id. at 644-645.
22 Id. at 637.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 638.
26 Id. at 638-639.
27 See, In re Brianna C., 98 Conn. App. 797, 802, (2006) (“[a] finding of neglect is not
necessarily predicated on actual harm, but can exist when there is a potential risk of neglect”).
28 See, e.g. People v. Dana S. (In re Tamesha T.), 384 Ill. Dec. 370, 373-374, 16 N.E.3d
763, 766-767 (2014) (Department involved after receiving hotline calls reporting neglect of
minor children; Mother’s rights terminated for her failure to make progress in provided
services.)
29 See, e.g., In the Interest of A.L.W., No. 01-14-00805-CV, at *37-38 (Tex. Ct. App. July
14, 2015) (holding that inference can be made by parent’s failure to take initiative to complete
services required to regain custody of children, does not have the ability to motivate herself to
seek out available resources needed now or in the future.).
20
21
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Custody

Custody is probably the most divisive issue of any divorce.
This is especially true when one parent alleges that the other parent is
unfit. The court makes its custody award decision based on what is in
the best interest of the child. This means confronting the issue of
fitness-to-parent of each party.
Part and parcel to the fitness of the parent is the determination
of the best interests of the child in a proceeding for exclusive custody. 30
One of the many factors in determining the best interests of the child
is “any history of abuse by one parent against any child, or the other
parent.” 31 Courts must also consider the evidence as to the likelihood
the parent will further abuse or neglect the child before making a
determination as to fitness and custody. 32
Factors that a court may use to determine a person’s fitness as a parent
include:
* A history of substantiated child abuse. Child
maltreatment of any kind, especially physical, sexual or
emotional abuse, will likely mean the parent will be
allowed—if any—only infrequent visitation rights.
Supervised visitation will be ordered when a
caregiver’s behavior puts the child at risk. Supervised
visitation may be ordered in the face of allegations of
sexual abuse, substantiated by expert witnesses. 33
It is not unusual for one parent’s allegation that the
other parent physically abused the children to be
unfounded. 34 Rather, after an investigation by a
guardian ad litem, a court can order a parent to have
supervised visitation, because “unsupervised visitation
would further impair the emotional development,
endanger the physical health of the … youngest
30 CAL. FAM. CODE § 3021(d); See, also, Montenegro v. Diaz, 26 Cal. 4th 249, 255 (2001)
(holding that the health, safety and welfare of the child, any history of abuse by one parent
against the child or the other parent, and the nature and amount of contact with the parents.).
31 Montenegro supra note 30.
32 In re C.W., No. 84, at *26 (Ct. Spec. App. Jan. 3, 2019).
33 Ex parte Thompson, 51 So.3d 265, 271 (Ala. 2010).
34 Noland-Vance v. Vance ( In re Noland-Vance), 321 S.W.3d 398, 420 (Mo. Ct. App.
2010).
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children.” 35
* A history of psychiatric concerns. The court may
insist on seeing a thorough psychiatric history to
determine if a parent has any mental health disorder that
may be considered a risk to a child. Counseling and
medical records must demonstrate suitability to parent.
Courts have also ordered the parent to undergo an
evaluation, and participation in therapy as a means
toward unsupervised visitation. 36
* A history of domestic violence. A thorough
examination of all domestic violence claims will be
investigated, especially if children were witness to
those events. 37
* A history of substance abuse. Parents who present
with previous substance abuse and dependency issues
will need to demonstrate longstanding temperance and
dependability to be awarded any type of custody. A
track record of relapses could defeat any chance of
visitation or custody. 38
* The parent’s ability to communicate with their child.
The failure to communicate with one’s child may
become an issue regardless of the circumstances. 39 The
court will want evidence that a parent has the ability to
empathize and constructively communicate with their
child and that the parent is attuned to the child’s
needs. 40 Courts will place particular weight upon the
parent’s inability to place the needs of the child before
35

Id.
Matter of Harder v. Phetteplace, 93 A.D.3d 1199, 1200 (App. Div. 2012); see also, Matter
of Procopio v. Procopio, 132 A.D.3d 1243, 1244 (App. Div. 2015)(supervised visitation was
appropriate in order to provide the stability and consistency that the mother needed as she
continued to work on her mental health issues)
37 Matter of Chilbert v. Soler, 77 A.D.3d 1405, 1406 (App. Div. 2010) (father committed
acts of domestic violence against the mother, often in the child’s presence, and that he
threatened to kill the mother and leave with the child).
38 See A.R.S. § 8-533(B) (2), (3), (11). “Long-lasting substance abuse “need not be constant
to be considered chronic.” Raymond F. V. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 377 ¶ 16
(App. 2010).
39 See discussion at Incarceration.
40 Hammersley v. Hammersley, No. FA074014518, 2011 Conn. Super. LEXIS 178 (Super.
Ct. Jan. 20, 2011)
36
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her needs. 41 A parent’s inability to deal constructively
with a child’s crisis, the child’s educational needs,
medical needs, anger, or blaming the other parent for
the child’s troublesome behavior are factors which may
result in the parent losing custody and the ability to
make health, education and welfare decisions regarding
a child. 42
* The child’s preferences. Depending on the child’s
age, the court may consider a child’s wishes. This
usually applies to older and mature children. 43
Although a court may inquire into the child’s
preference as to custody, it is not binding upon the
court. 44 Furthermore, the custody preference “must be
weighed according to the age and maturity child.” 45
In considering the communication between the parent
and the child, the court must be mindful as to whether
that parent’s efforts were thwarted by the other parent
or a third party. 46

41
42
43

Id.
Id. at 7-8.
CALI. FAM. CODE §3042, subsections (a) through (d) specifically state:
(a) If a child is of sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to form an
intelligent preference as to custody or visitation, the court shall consider,
and give due weight to, the wishes of the child in making an order granting
or modifying custody or visitation.
(b) In addition to the requirements of subdivision (b) of Section 765 of the
Evidence Code, the court shall control the examination of a child witness
so as to protect the best interests of the child.
(c) If the child is 14 years of age or older and wishes to address the court
regarding custody or visitation, the child shall be permitted to do so, unless
the court determines that doing so is not in the child’s best interests. In
that case, the court shall state its reasons for that finding on the record.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to prevent a child who is
less than 14 years of age from addressing the court regarding custody or
visitation, if the court determines that is appropriate pursuant to the child’s
best interests.

Id.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10(1)(e); see also K.P.S. v. E.J.P., 414 P.3d 933, 941 (Utah Ct.
App. 2018).
45 K.P.S. v. E.J.P., 414 P.3d 933, 941 (citing Larson v. Larson, 888 P.2d 719, 725 n.8 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994)) (citing an earlier version of Utah Code section 30-3-10(1)).
46 See generally Graham v. Starr, 415 N.E.2d 772 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
44
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Incarceration

The growing jail and prison population has resulted in
collateral effects on children. Unique challenges and barriers are faced
While video and teleconferencing
by incarcerated parents. 47
technology are available as a means for the parent to participate in the
life of their child, an assessment will often be made to determine
whether the incarcerated parent has maintained a meaningful role in
the child’s life. Evidence of past communication patterns may be
persuasive. A parent’s incarceration, in and of itself, is not considered
a mitigating circumstance. 48 Nor is incarceration, alone, considered
grounds for termination of parental rights. 49 Moreover, a parent has an
obligation to maintain continuous contact with the child, not just after
a Petition to Terminate Parental Rights. 50
D.

Disability or Incompetence

A parent’s disability or incompetence, in and of itself, is not
grounds to determine fitness. 51 The fact that a parent has a mental
illness does not, as such, constitute a lack of fitness to parent a child.52
The focus is whether the parent is able to recognize the extent or
gravity of the mental illness which results in putting her own needs
above that of the child. 53
III.

JEWISH LEGAL PERSPECTIVES

The Talmud (Shabbat 31a) relates the often-cited story of a
prospective proselyte who approached the great Sage Hillel the Elder
47 In re M.D. v. K.A., 921 N.W.2d 229 (Iowa 2019). The Iowa Supreme Court held that an
incarcerated parent has a constitutional due process right to participate in the entire TPR
hearing, and the trial court has a responsibility to ensure the parent can respond to the state’s
evidence.
48 See e.g., J.B.D. v. J.M.D., 151 S.W.3d 885, 889 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (father
communication with child began only after the filing of the petition to terminate parental
rights).
49 § 211.447 R.S.Mo.7 (6).
50 J.B.D. v. J.M.D., 151 S.W.3d 885, 890 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); cf; In re J.M.S. v. A.S., 83
S.W.3d 76, 84 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (While incarcerated, father’s continuous contact through
letters with his child did not support a finding of abandonment).
51 See gernally, In re D.R.M,, 198 A.3d. 756 (2018).
52 Id.at 764, (citing In re D.S. 88 A3d.678,694(2014)) (quoting In re J.G., 831 A.2d 992,
1000-01(D.C. 2003)).
53 Id.at 764.
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and demanded that Hillel convert him “on the condition that you teach
me the entire Torah while I stand on one leg.” Hillel famously
responded, “That which is hateful to you do not do to your friend. The
rest is commentary - go and learn.”
In analyzing Jewish law’s perspective on child custody, most
authorities could encapsulate the subject in a single phrase: the best
interests of the child. The source material that we analyze – both in
the Codes and early commentaries and in published rulings of the
Israeli Rabbinic Courts over the last 70 years – largely fleshes out the
details of what constitutes best interests and how to arrive at such
determinations. While most of the literature addresses situations
where one parent is deceased, or the parents are divorced, the
principles are relevant as well to other situations in which a parent or
parents may be incapable of properly caring for their children.
In addressing the appropriate custodial arrangement for a child
whose mother remarries, the Talmud (Ketubot 102b) writes that a
daughter belongs with her mother regardless of the child’s age. 54 The
Talmud does not explicitly address parallel custodial arrangements for
sons. Still, the implication of the Talmud (Ketubot 65b) as understood
by Maimonides (Mishneh Torah Ishut 5:17) and most medieval
authorities is that the default scenario has sons living with the mother
until the age of six and with the father after the age of six. 55
Many medieval authorities view these guidelines as simply
reflective of what would typically be deemed in the best interests of
the child. R. Yosef ibn Migash (1077-1141; Responsum 71) was asked
54 See decison of the rabbinic court of Haifa (Case 1238603 - 2003) that analyzes the
reasoning behind this rule. There is a minority opinion cited by R. Asher ben Yechiel (12501327) that the Talmudic position that a daughter belongs with the mother applies only when
the mother is widowed (and the question is whether the daughter should stay with the father’s
relatives) but not when the parents are divorced.
55 The Talmud there indicates that a father must financially support his son until the age of
six even if the son is living with his mother. Once a son reaches the age of six the father may
insist that he will only provide financial support if the son moves in with him. See Maimonides
(Mishneh Torah, Ishut 5:17). This is codified by R. Yosef Caro (Shulchan Aruch Even HaEzer
82:7). There is a debate as to whether Maimonides allows a father to remove a six-year-old
son from his mother’s custody or merely to withhold child support so long as the son remains
in his mother’s custody. See also Ra’abad (R. Avraham ben David, 1125-1198, glosses to
Maimonides ibid.), who rules that a father may assume custody of a son from the point that he
is obligated to teach him Torah, which corresponds to the age of four or five. R. Vidal of
Tolosa (Magid Mishneh, fourteenth century, ibid.) questions Ra’abad’s assumption that the
obligation to educate one’s sons begins before the age of six, and notes that even if that were
to be the case, the mother’s custody should not be an impediment to the father having visitation
rights that would allow him to oversee his son’s education.
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about a six-year-old girl whose parents divorced when she was four, at
which point her father left for another city and did not leave any
financial support for his ex-wife or daughter. The mother cared for the
daughter and supported her single-handedly until the father returned
two years hence and demanded custody of the daughter. R. ibn Migash
rules that typically a daughter is better off in the care of her mother,
who is better positioned to teach her “the ways of women” including
spinning and taking care of the house. 56
Similarly, R. Shlomo ben Aderet (1235-1310; Responsum
7:38) writes that although typically daughters belong with the mother
because the mother will teach “the ways of the woman” and sons
belong with the father who will teach them Torah, the rabbinic courts
must always determine what is in the best interests of every child in
every case. 57 In the words of R. Samuel de Medina (1505-1589, Shu”t
56 He also adds that in the case at hand, there was an additional concern that the father had
a track record of frequently traveling to foreign countries which would not be in the best
interests of the child.
57 See also R. Meir Katzenellenbogen (Maharam of Padua, 1482 -1564, Responsum 53),
who articulates the best interests principle and is the source for the authoritative ruling of R.
Moshe Isserles (1530-1572) in his glosses to Shulchan Aruch (Even Haezer 82:7). See R.
Mordechai HaLevi (Darchei Noam 26, published 1667). Chelkat Mechokek (R. Moshe
Meisels, 1605-1668) (Even Haezer 82:10) and Beit Shmuel (R’ Shmuel of Szydłów, 16501706) (Even Haezer 82:9) both note that the default arrangement must still reflect the Tamudic
guidelines unless there is sufficient evidence to convince a beit din that the best interests of
the child are served by a different arrangement. R. Moshe Shturnbuch,a leading contemporary
authority (Teshuvot V’hanhagot 1:783), notes that while in earlier times the father’s
responsibility to educate his sons over the age of six made him the default custodial parent for
such children, since nowadays most communities have access to appropriate educational
institutions that a mother could send her children to just as well, the child’s best interests
should be evaluated without that default presumption.
R. Michael Broyde, Child Custody in Jewish Law: A Conceptual Analysis, 36 RABBI JACOB
JOSEPH SCHOOL JOURNAL OF HALACHA AND CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 22, 21-46 (1999)
presents as a matter of dispute among rabbinic authorities whether parental rights carry more
weight in custodial determinations than best interests. It seems more compelling that the broad
consensus of rabbinic authorities throughout the ages view best interests as the primary
determining factor and the authorities differ as to the relative weight of other factors when the
best interests are not otherwise obvious. See 5 ELIAV SHOCHATMAN, THE ESSENCE OF THE
PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE CUSTODY OF CHILDREN IN JEWISH LAW” (HEBREW), SHENATON
L’MISHPAT HAIVRI 285 ET. SEQ. (1978) who presents a similar analysis. Yechiel Kaplan, Child
Custody in Jewish Law: From Authority of the Father to the Best Interest of the Child in 24
JOURNAL OF LAW AND RELIGION 1, 89 et. seq. (2008)) unconvincingly argues that there was a
shift in Jewish law between the ancient and Talmudic period and the medieval period, with
best interests only becoming significant later in history.
The following printed decisions of the rabbinical courts in Israel reflect principles of the best
interests of children: Piskei Din Rabbanim (henceforth PDR) Vol. 1 pp.55 et. seq., pp.65 et.
seq., pp. 145 et. seq., pp. 161 et. seq., pp. 173 et. seq.; Vol. 3, pp. 353 et. seq.; Vol. 4 pp. 93
et. seq. (reprinted in Kovetz Teshuvot 2: 115), pp. 332 et. seq.; Vol. 7 pp 3 et. seq.; Vol. 11
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Maharshdam Even Haezer 123), there are no parental rights to child
custody; the only rights at play are those of the children. 58
A.

Awarding Custody to a Third Party

Rabbinic authorities apply the best interest principle even in
situations where there is only one living or competent parent, and the
rabbinic court deems it in the best interest of the child to live with a
relative other than the surviving parent. R. David ben Solomon ibn
Abi Zimra (1479-1573; Teshuvot Radvaz 1:123) addressed a widower
with a sickly young son who wanted his child removed from the
maternal grandmother’s custody. The widower had not remarried, was
poor, and would have to leave his son with neighbors when going to
pp. 366 et.seq.;Vol. 13 pp. 335 et. seq.; Osef Piskei Din (henceforth OPD) Vol. 2 pp. 6 et. seq.
[In this 1946 decision, the Court of Appeals under the leadership of then Chief Rabbi Isaac
Herzog overturned a lower court ruling that had split custody of two daughters between their
father and their mother. The lower court’s rationale was that since both parents were blind
and needed assistance, it served the needs of the parents to award each parent one child. The
Court of Appeals found that since custody determinations should consider the best interests of
the children and not the needs of the parents, the lower court’s decision was misguided.] An
incomplete list of more recent published decisions that affirm these principles (most of which
are
posted
at
https://www.gov.il/he/Departments/DynamicCollectors/verdict_the_rabbinical_courts)
include Case 1117210 (Jerusalem 2019), Case 1084672 (Tel Aviv 2019); Case 1130804 (Tel
Aviv 2018), Case 1142916 (Court of Appeals undated) Case 1238384 (Court of Appeals
2004), Case 1294927 (Court of Appeals 2005) Case 1230849 (Haifa 2004), Case 1238603
(Haifa 2003).
We should note that the Israeli rabbinic courts strongly rely on the recommendations of mental
health professionals and social workers in determining the best interests of the children. In a
recent case, the Court of Appeals (1149751 2018) overturned a lower court ruling because the
lower court had not given sufficient weight to the recommendation of the social worker.
58 Maharshdam rules that the default position that a daughter belongs with her mother does
not necessarily give unconditional license to the mother to move far away such that the father
(in a case of divorce) or the father’s relatives who have financial responsibilities to the
daughter (in a case of a widowed mother) would have little or no visitation privileges. See
also R. Moses ben Joseph di Trani (1505-1585, Mabit 1:165), who ruled that the paternal
grandfather of a deceased father had the right to prevent the widowed mother from moving
away with her sons so that he could be better positioned to provide for their educational needs.
R. Ovadia Yosef (in a brief addendum appended to Tzitz Eliezer 16:44; originally printed in
PDR Vol. 13 pp. 26-27) notes that while Maharshdam’s position is not universally accepted,
many later authorities do embrace it. R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv (Kovetz Teshuvot 2:115),
who served for many years on the Israeli Rabbinic Court of Appeals, notes that the
Maharshdam’s ruling addressed a case where the mother wanted to move to a location that
was a two or three day trip away on dangerous roads. However, if a mother wishes to move
to a place that is a two hour drive away from the father’s residence, there is no reason to
prevent her from doing so, as reasonable visitation could be arranged in such a situation. See
also a ruling of current Chief Rabbi David Lau’s panel of the Court of Appeals, reprinted in
Maskil L’David: Piskei Maran HaRav Elyashiv (Jerusalem 2019), pp. 56-63.
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work. Radvaz ruled that the child should stay with his grandmother,
who was better able to provide the medical care that the child needed,
and there was a concern that he might die under the father’s watch.
The non-suitability of the father’s care was heightened in this case by
his having no suitable daycare option, but Radvaz writes that he would
have ruled the same way even had the father been able to stay home all
day, as the best interests of the son were served by staying with his
grandmother. 59
In a 1954 ruling of the rabbinical court of Jerusalem (Piskei
Din Rabbanim (henceforth P.D.R.) Vol. 1 pp.65 et. seq.), a panel that
included R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv addressed a custody dispute
between a divorced mother and the father of the mentally unstable
father. Everyone agreed that the father was unable to care for his
children. However, the father’s father requested custody, claiming that
he would be better positioned to provide for the educational needs of
the children. The mother argued that were custody to be awarded to
the paternal grandfather; the father would inevitably have more contact
with the children than would be healthy. After clearly articulating the
best interest principle, the panel concluded that the best interests of the
children involved remaining in the mother’s care provided that she
would continue to send the children to the schools that they were
previously attending. However, the rabbinical court notes as a
hypothetical that had the paternal grandfather lived far away from the
father such that there would be no concern about the father’s
involvement, the paternal grandfather would have a much stronger
claim of custody over his grandson (although not granddaughter). 60

59 See also R. Asher ben Yechiel (Shu”t HaRosh 82:2) who writes that the decision about
whether a daughter of a deceased mother should live with her father or maternal grandfather
should be made by someone who knows both candidates and can presumably best judge what
arrangement better suits the girl. His starting assumption is that absent other considerations,
a daughter would presumably be more comfortable living with her own father.
60 In Case 1238603 (Haifa 2003), the court dealt with the children of a divorced couple in
which neither parent was deemed fit to care for the children. The court had to decide between
awarding custody to the mother’s sister or the father’s mother. It chose the former primarily
because the mother’s sister worked part time and had no children of her own, whereas the
father’s mother worked full time (by Israeli standards) and had five children of her own at
home.
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Religious Shortcomings as an Impediment to
Parenting

Rabbinic authorities address whether religious shortcomings
on the part of one parent may allow for the removal of a child from
that parent’s custody. Radvaz (1:263) addresses a seven-year-old girl
who was living with her mother after her parents divorced. The father
discovered that his ex-spouse gave birth to a child out of wedlock and
petitioned that he be awarded sole custody so that the daughter would
not be negatively influenced by her mother’s iniquities. Radvaz ruled
in favor of the father, writing that the default presumption that a
daughter belongs with her mother did not apply in this case, even if the
daughter herself would profess to prefer staying with her mother. He
goes even further in writing that even if there were no father in the
picture, the rabbinic court would be authorized to remove the child to
the custody of the father’s relatives or even to an appropriate foster
family. 61
In more recent times, R. Eliezer Waldenberg (1915-2006), a
senior judge on the Israeli Rabbinical High Court of Appeals,
responded to a request that four and seven-year-old children should be
removed from the mother’s custody and placed in the father’s care in
a case in which the parents divorced because the mother was having
an affair, and had abandoned her previous religious lifestyle, no longer
keeping Shabbat and kosher. In a 1977 decision, R. Waldenberg’s
panel (Tzitz Eliezer 15:50), relying on the advice of social workers as
well, determined that awarding custody to the father was the only way
to facilitate the proper religious education and lifestyle that the
children were used to and was thus in their best interest. 62 As a panel
61 Elsewhere Radvaz (1:360) even allowed the father’s relatives to remove a daughter from
the mother’s custody when the mother conducted herself in an indecent way or allowed
indecent men into her house. These rulings are cited as normative by R. Eliezer Waldenberg
(1915-2006, Tzitz Eliezer 17:50). See also Radvaz (1:429). In a recent case (Case 860851
Haifa 2018), a rabbinic court took away custody from a mother who was living with another
man out of wedlock (and denied doing so) in violation of a divorce agreement. See, however,
a 1953 ruling of the rabbinical court in Tel Aviv (PDR Vol. I p. 55 et. seq.), in which the court
was reluctant to remove a thirteen-year-old boy from the custody of his mother who was living
with another man out of wedlock.
62 See R. Yitzchak Yaakov Weiss (1902-1989 Minchat Yitzchak 7:113) who ruled that in a
case where both parents were observant of Jewish law, but the mother moved to Los Angeles
and the father lived in Brooklyn, the father was entitled to custody of his one-and-a-half-yearold son (who was no longer nursing). R Weiss observes that the father was better positioned
to ensure the proper education of the son. Had the parents been living in relative proximity to
each other, the default position would have been to award custody to the mother and visitation
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that included R. Elyashiv noted in a 1960 ruling of the Court of
Appeals (P.D.R. Vol 4 pp. 332 et. seq.), the best interests of children
do not only include their physical wellbeing but their spiritual
wellbeing as well.
It is worth noting that two recent rulings in the Israeli rabbinic
courts affirmed that a father’s personal religious prerogatives should
have no bearing on visitation determinations. The rabbinical court in
Petach Tikva (1171061/3 2019) was approached by a father with the
request to modify visitation arrangements to facilitate his ability to
pray with a quorum (a minyan). The status quo agreement had the
father picking up his four small children from their mother on alternate
Friday afternoons and returning them to their schools the following
Sunday morning. The father petitioned to be allowed to return the
children to the mother on Saturday night after the conclusion of
Shabbat so that he would be able to attend synagogue services on
Sunday morning. His request was rejected, as returning the children
late on a Saturday night would be disruptive both to the children and
to their mother, and these considerations outweighed the father’s
interest in his personal religious observances.
In a similar case brought in front of the Jerusalem court
(1161709/2) a father who was awarded visitation on alternate Jewish
holidays requested that he always receive the children for the first day
of Passover, to allow him to properly perform the commandment of
recalling the miracles of the Exodus to his children. The ruling
rejected his claim for many reasons, including the fact that the father’s
potentially enhanced religious experience is not more valuable than the
mother’s interest in having her children with her for a holiday.

to the father, which would allow the father to have a role in the son’s education. Since
significant visitation was impractical given the distance between the two, giving custody to
the father became the optimal choice. In a 1984 case of the Court of Appeals (PDR Vol. 13
pp. 335 et. seq.), a panel of R. Shlomo Dichovsky, R. Ezra Bar Shalom (son-in-law of R.
Ovadia Yosef), and R. Avraham removed children from the custody of a mother who had a
live-in boyfriend and who had stopped observing Shabbat and awarded custody to the religious
father. In a 1944 decision of the same court (PDR Vol. 1 pp. 28 et. seq.), a panel that included
R. Yitzchak Herzog and Rabbi Benzion Uziel, the two Chief Rabbis at the time, upheld a lower
court decision that awarded custody of a nine-year-old son to the mother because the father
was a public desecrator of Shabbat who did not live a religious lifestyle. See PDR Vol. 13 pp.
3 et. seq. in which a panel of the rabbinic court in Haifa disagreed internally about whether a
non-observant father should have a role in the education of his children regarding ethical
matters.
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Consideration of Children’s Preferences

There is little explicit discussion in earlier sources as to how
the stated preferences of children, both underage and of age, impact on
determinations of their best interests. R. Meir Katzenellenbogen
(Maharam of Padua, 1482 -1564, Responsum 53) writes that if a girl
who is old enough to indicate a preference reasonably does so, that
request will trump other default considerations. 63 In a 1954 ruling of
the Tel Aviv rabbinical court (P.D.R. Vol. 1 p. 158), the panel ruled
that even visitation with a non-custodial parent cannot be considered
in the child’s best interests if the child (who, in the case at hand, was a
nine-year-old girl) protests such visits.64

He was addressing an eleven-year-old girl who was orphaned from her father who
expressed her interest to live with her older brothers, who were deemed capable of supporting
and caring for her, and not her mother. Even though the girl was not yet “of age” according
to Jewish law (i.e. under twelve), she was old enough to have a reasonable understanding of
where she wanted to live. Had the girl not expressed any preference, custody would have by
default been assigned to her mother. There may also be an implication in Radvaz (1:429) that
a son’s preference to remain with his mother may override other objective considerations in
determining custody of a son orphaned from his father. See a recent ruling of the Court of
Appeals (1149751 2018) which noted that the courts should strongly take into consideration
the preference of children who are twelve to fourteen but not those who are four or five.
64 However, rabbinic courts may sometimes be skeptical about the stated preferences of
children, when the court suspects that one parent is turning the child against the other parent
in an attempt to limit or eliminate the other parent’s custody or visitation privileges. In Case
1230849 (Haifa 2004) the court found that a father’s claim that the mother was acting
irresponsibly because she cut her daughter’s hair too short, extinguished a cigarette on her
daughter, and hit her daughter was unconvincing because the mother claimed that she had cut
the hair to prevent getting lice, the cigarette incident was an accident when her daughter ran
into her, and the hitting was only on rare occasion for acceptable disciplinary reasons. For
other recent cases in which the rabbinic courts addressed unfounded claims to reconsider
custodial arrangements see Case 992673 (Jerusalem 2019), Case 860851 (Haifa 2018), Case
1097696 (Tiberias 2018), Case 120850 (Beer Sheva 2017), Case 882974 (Haifa 2017), Case
1022685 (Tel Aviv 2016), Case 653935 (Ashkelon 2015). See a recent ruling of the rabbinical
court in Jerusalem (964046-21, 2019) in a case where a mother represented that her daughter
refused to visit with her father. The judges wrote that they were convinced that the mother
was perpetuating false accusations of the father being abusive in order to limit his visitation
rights. The decision observes that one of the responsibilities of a custodial parent is to
encourage and ensure that the noncustodial parent fulfills the appropriate visitation
arrangements. See also ruling of Netanya (292687/2) which fined a mother for unjustly turning
her children against their father. In case 910711 (Tel Aviv 2017), the court removed a child
from his father’s custody (and fined the father) because the father was brainwashing the child
against the mother.
63

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020

17

